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Abstract: 
Fluctuations in the presence of dynastic politicians in national legislatures 
are seen as an important indicator of political modernisation. Drawing on 
original biographical details of Greek Members of Parliament (MPs) from 
the six most recent parliamentary terms we document the existence of a 
substantial and relatively stable pool of dynastic MPs. Their numbers only 
appear to shrink, albeit not too dramatically, in the 2012 elections, which 
also marked the collapse of the traditional party system. Findings 
highlight patterns of stability that have remained unnoticed under more 
visible shifts in party competition during the economic crisis. 
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This contribution takes a systematic look at a core feature of Greek 
politics, namely dynastic Members of Parliament (MPs). Dynastic MPs are 
defined here as deputies from a family that has at least another close 
member serving in the same or in a previous parliamentary term.  
Empirical studies of the phenomenon find a substantial presence of 
dynastic politicians across national legislatures. Having largely ignored the 
Greek case, these analyses conclude that individuals from a political 
family enjoy career advantages in various regime types ranging from 
single-party states to mature democracies (Clubok, Wilensky & Berghorn 
1969; Camp 1982; Tanner & Feder 1993; Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 2009; 
Feinstein 2010; for a systematic study of Greek politics that also covers 
dynastic parliamentarians see Legg 1969). Regarding the substantive 
implications of the phenomenon, dynastic politicians are considered a 
form of traditional political authority. A decline in their numbers is treated 
as evidence of the modernisation of the political system. 
This paper employs original biographical data to document the 
presence of dynastic MPs in the Greek parliament at the beginning of six 
recent sessions: 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, May 2012, and June 2012. 
Greece is studied as a critical case (Eckstein 1975). A cultural setting 
where kinship is still central and an electoral system where voters are free 
to choose individual candidates rather than closed party lists, the country 
serves as a most-likely instance of observing an extensive dynastic 
phenomenon in twenty-first century Europe (Mouzelis 1986; Lyrintzis 
1991; Nitsiakos 1993). A key question examined is whether the trend that 
applies to other Western democracies for which we have systematic 
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information also applies to Greece. Put differently, is the pool of dynastic 
MPs shrinking over time and, by extension, is this evidence of political 
modernisation?  
We focus on the six general elections that took place between 2000 
and 2012 as the early twenty-first century marks a period of important 
changes for Greece. It starts very positively with WKHFRXQWU\¶V
qualification for Eurozone entry and relatively high rates of economic 
growth among South European countries. This gives way to deteriorating 
public finances and an international bailout in 2010, followed by profound 
fiscal consolidation, a severe, protracted recession, and record levels of 
public disaffection with the political class. The two electoral races of 2012, 
the most recent ones to date, effectively mark the collapse of the 
traditional party system (Lyrintzis 2011; Pappas 2013). Studying the 
dynastic phenomenon between 2000 and 2012 allows us to observe its 
dynamics during a transformative period for the country. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. An overview of existing 
scholarship examines the parliamentary presence of dynastic politicians 
across party systems. The text continues with a discussion of the Greek 
context in cultural, historical and current terms in order to justify case 
selection. This is followed by a description of the biographical data and 
then, by key results. We find that kinship ties among Greek legislators are 
extensive and resilient over time. We also witness a modest drop in the 
numbers of dynastic MPs in the 2012 elections. We acknowledge that it is 
too early to determine whether the 2012 elections have set off a long-
term dynastic decline. The conclusion considers various limitations of the 
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analysis, along with implications for our understanding of developments in 
comparable settings. 
 
Dynastic Office in Comparative Perspective 
Empirical analyses of family connections among politicians cover a wide 
variety of cases that range from the United States (Clubok, Wilensky & 
Berghorn 1969; Kurtz 1989; Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 2009; Feinstein 
2010), various Latin American countries (for example, see Camp 1982), 
Ireland (Gallagher 1985, 2003), Britain (Guttsman 1963), India (Chhibber 
2013), China (Tanner & Feder 1993), Taiwan (Li & White 1988), the 
Philippines (Querubin 2010), and Japan (Isibashi & Reed 1992). There is 
wide variation in the measurement of kinship ties among elected 
politicians. Differences in operationalisation often impede direct 
comparisons across studies. For instance, while most systematic works 
employ censuses of elected members of the national legislature, others 
also examine governors (Querubin 2010), party officials (Tanner & Feder 
RUWKRVHLQµSXEOLFVHUYLFH¶LQFOXGLQJGLSORPDts (Guttsman 1963). 
Similar inconsistencies affect what counts as a µUHODWLYH¶RUµFORVHUHODWLYH¶
with some definitions being more precise and restrictive than others.  
The electoral advantage of dynastic politicians has been explained with 
reference to various types of capital transfers from first generation 
legislators to their offspring (Putnam 1976; Laband & Lentz 1985; Kurtz 
1989; Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 2009; Feinstein 2010). These transfers 
include: i) political capital (family contacts within the party machine, and 
across donor and canvassing networks; constituent loyalty to the family 
 5 
 
µbrand¶ name); and ii) human capital (socialisation that develops a 
heightened sense of civic duty; political knowledge and efficacy; and 
generally a µtalent¶ for politics).  
On the basis of the most recent and robust evidence, political capital 
flows appear to be the key explanation of dynastic advantage (Dal Bó, Dal 
Bó & Snyder 2009; Feinstein 2010). That is to say, dynastic candidates 
are more likely to be elected in parliament on the basis of their 
membership to a social category per se (family links to other MPs) rather 
than on the basis of superior abilities developed through that 
membership. The implications for the quality of democracy are negative. 
Political capital transfers imply that power becomes µself-perpetuating¶: 
belonging to a political family allows you to have a career in politics 
irrespective of - even despite ± personal abilities (Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 
2009, p. 115).  
Inherited political power is considered a threat to equality and 
representation. The existence of dynastic politicians violates basic 
principles upheld by modern liberal democracies. Specifically, the dynastic 
presence means that political personnel are recruited on the basis of 
ascriptive rather than universal criteria. TKHSROLWLFDOFODVVLVµFORVHG¶WR
outsiders and overrepresents insiders (self-reproducing, oligarchic 
tendencies). This, in a negative feedback mechanism, discourages political 
involvement from outsiders. More generally, power is distributed unfairly. 
In this sense, the presence of political families in a legislature has been 
used as a rough measure of political modernisation. A decline in the 
numbers of dynastic politicians is interpreted as a sign of the opening up 
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of the party system to a broader mass of citizens, and of the erosion of 
traditional, non rational political loyalties, such as those based on local, 
familial, ethnic or religious foundations (Clubok, Wilensky & Berghorn 
1969, p. 1038; cf. Huntington 1966).  
Regarding the prevalence of the phenomenon, Isibashi and Reed 
(1992) report the dynastic presence in the Japanese Diet at 45 per cent. 
Querubin (2010) cites an even higher figure for the Philippines, where 
more than half of all elected members of Congress and governors are 
preceded by a relative in office. These political systems, however, are not 
ideal as points of comparison with the Greek context. 
To review more comparable countries we turn to Western 
democracies. Some of these cases, such as Ireland and the USA, resemble 
Greece even further in the sense that election to office there requires high 
personal visibility. Starting with Ireland, the dynastic presence in the Dail 
fell slightly from 25 per cent in 1982 to 22 per cent in 2002 (Gallagher 
1985, 2003). A similar pattern of dynastic erosion has been found in the 
Netherlands in the 1970s (Leijenaar & Niemöller 2003). An extensive 
study of the United States documents 24 per cent dynastic members 
serving in Congress during 1790, a number that becomes 14 per cent by 
1860, and five per cent by 1960 (Clubok, Wilensky & Berghorn 1969). 
'RJDQ¶VDQDO\VLVRI)UHQFKPLQLVWHULDOFDUHHUVILQGVa similar 
decline in the percentage of dynastic Cabinet members between 1870 and 
1978. In Britain, the curtailment of the number of hereditary peers in the 
unelected House of Lords (House of Lords Act 1999), and the long-term 
ZHDNHQLQJRIWKHXSSHUKRXVH¶VIRUPDOSRZHUVVHHµweak bicameralism¶ 
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in Lijphart 1999) point to a declining dynastic trend. In all cases, these 
developments can be interpreted as evidence of the modernisation of the 
political system.  
 
The Greek Case 
The following section provides an overview of the Greek setting in cultural, 
historical and current terms in order to justify case selection and to offer a 
detailed description of the 2000-2012 period covered by the data. 
 
A Dynastic Tradition 
Numerous works highlight WKHSLYRWDOUROHRIWKHµVRXWKHUQIDPLO\¶PRGHO
an ideal type that applies to Greece and to other countries of the 
Mediterranean region (Campbell 1964; Peristiany 1976; Nitsiakos 1993). 
Key features of this model of family organisation include strong 
intergenerational ties and a collectivist ethos, which extend to matters of 
social care, welfare support and business transactions.  
The family is equally prominent in Greek politics not least because of 
the foundational role of local clans in modern Greek history. With its 
origins in the nineteenth centuryWKHFRXQWU\¶Vpolitical system revolved 
around the extensive clientelist networks built by a number of notable 
families (tzakia). These families had played an important role during the 
war of independence from Ottoman rule in 1821-1832 (Mouzelis 1986; 
Lyrintzis 1991).1 The major electoral advantage of individuals from a 
political family was their access to client-patron mechanisms built by other 
family members. Mouzelis defines the phenomenon in more general terms 
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DVµROLJDUFKLFSDUOLDPHQWDU\UXOH¶WRGHVFULEH a political arrangement 
developed in Greece and other countries of the semi-periphery after their 
independence. Oligarchic parliamentary rule featured a number of political 
families that used their local power to constrain and channel mass (lower 
class, typically agrarian) political participation, but retained a formal 
system of apparently pluralistic representation (Mouzelis 1986, p. 3).  
The era of oligarchic parliamentarism came gradually to an end in 
Greece with the rise of new, middle-class social forces in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century (Mouzelis 1986, p. 42). In line 
with this observation, Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2002), who update data 
from Legg (1969), report that between 1878 and 1910 more than half of 
all Cabinet ministers came from political families. The dynastic tendency 
at ministerial level shows a steady decline after that period (Sotiropoulos 
& Bourikos 2002, pp. 194-195).  
However, the presence of political families benefiting from established 
patronage networks remained more prominent in parliament. Though the 
data are fragmentary, Legg reports four in ten deputies in 1964 as coming 
from a political family (Legg 1969, pp. 265-271). The dynastic component 
of that parliament, which was concentrated in the two main parties, was 
even higher than in a previous election held in 1958. Although applying an 
unclear operational definition of political family ties, Legg documents a 
clear electoral advantage of candidates from political families during that 
period. 
The dynastic presence in parliament survived the collapse of the 
military regime in 1974 and the transition to democratic politics. In the 
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first elections that were held after the military regime even the new, 
socialist party that would soon dominate Greek politics included MPs 
descending from established political families of the pre-dictatorship era. 
This seems to have reflected an effort by the party leader, a dynastic 
politician himself, to capitalise on name recognition and old patronage 
networks LQKLVSDUW\¶VILUVWHOHFWRUDOFRQWHVWV3DSSDVSS-
323). For the entire period that begins in 1974 and up to 2004, political 
commentators report a summary figure of 193 dynastic members in a 
total of 1,191 MPs from all parties, or approximately 16 per cent 
(Tziovaras & Chiotis 2004, p. 39). $FRPSDULVRQRIWKLVILJXUHZLWK/HJJ¶V
account suggests a declining, but still sizeable parliamentary presence 
over time. 
Regarding prime-ministers in the same period, Table 1 shows that six 
out of eight Greek prime ministers since 1974 have been close relatives of 
political figures that preceded them in politics. One of the exceptions to 
this trend, Konstantinos Karamanlis, was himself the founder of the 
Karamanlis political dynasty.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
From a more qualitative perspective (cf. Clogg 1987, p. 143), we note 
that supporters in the electorate and the media still distinguish among 
prime ministers from the same family using forenames only: for example, 
µAndreas¶ for Andreas Papandreou to differentiate him from his father and 
his son. In other words, the family name is taken for granted. Dynasty 
 10 
 
founders or senior members of a political family are often referred to as 
µgeros¶ (old man). For instance, the label is still used today for Georgios 
Papandreou (1888-1968) and Konstantinos Karamanlis (1907-1998). The 
use of µgeros¶ is also common at constituency level to refer to older 
generation MPs in cases where candidates share the same family name. 
Finally, family names serve as typical labels that demarcate factions, not 
necessarily ideological in nature, within parties. Examples are 
µPapandreikoi¶ or µKaramanlikoi¶, which are semi-formal labels still in use 
today.2 
 
The Electoral Context: 2000 to 2012 
$IWHUVHYHQ\HDUVRIPLOLWDU\UXOHWKHFRXQWU\¶VWUDQVLWLRQWRGHPRFUDWLF
politics in 1974 and particularly the 1981 election marked the birth of a 
dominant feature of contemporary Greek politics that survived until 
recently: a succession of strong single-party governments formed either 
by ND (ƱƿĮ ƩǆǋǎǉǏĮĲǁĮ ± New Democracy, centre right) or PASOK 
(ƴĮǌİǊǊǀǌǈǎ ƶǎıǈĮǊǈıĲǈǉǗ ƮǁǌǆǋĮ - Panhellenic Socialist Movement, centre 
left) (Pappas 2003). These two cartel partiesµEHLQJLQFRQWURORID
JHQHURXVVWDWHNHHQWRGLVWULEXWHSROLWLFDOUHQWV¶3DSSDVS 
were highly successful in elections as evident in their combined share of 
the national vote, typically above 80 per cent. For instance, the combined 
share of the vote for ND and PASOK was 87 per cent in 2000 and a 
relatively µPHDJUH¶SHUFHQWLQ7DEOHJLYHVDVXPPDU\RI
recent general election results.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
The operation of the Greek political system in the last three decades, 
built around the iteration in office of ND and PASOK up to and including 
the 2009 election, has been identified as a key domestic explanation of 
the ongoing economic crisis. Particular features of the system have been 
KLJKOLJKWHGLQFOXGLQJµWKHILVFDOSURIOLJDF\RIWKH*UHHNVWDWHFOLHQWHOLVP
and corruption, the populist practices of the Greek political parties, [and] 
the inefficienF\RIWKHVWDWHPDFKLQH¶/\ULQW]LVSAlong with 
EU-related processes, Pappas describes two key mechanisms that explain 
the survival of the system for such a long time, as well as its sudden 
collapse: 
 
A state bent on handing out political rents to practically every 
member of society; and a party system built to ensure the 
distribution of these rents in an orderly and democratic way²
that is, by turns rather than in one go. Taken together, these 
two mechanisms led to a fine coordination of aims between 
the political class and the vast majority of Greeks, enabling 
both sides to exploit the state and its resources in a 
seemingly non±zero-sum fashion (Pappas 2013, p. 33). 
 
Once the global recession of 2008/2009 reached Europe, the dire state 
RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VILQDQFHVZDVquickly revealed. These combined an 
upwardly revised budget deficit and an unsustainable debt burden. Faced 
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with the risk of disorderly default, PASOK and, later, ND supported the 
implementation of an extensive austerity programme. The programme 
was attached to the acceptance of an international bailout package in May 
2010. The prolonged economic recession that ensued turned rapidly into 
unprecedented social unrest and public frustration with the political 
establishment.3 Eurobarometer data for Greece suggest a collapse of trust 
towards the key components of the political system (political parties, 
parliament and government). Table 3 provides evidence of this decline 
with 2010 marking a defining moment. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
After a few months of caretaker government with the support of the 
two major parties, voters expressed their resentment in the general 
election of May 2012. The contest led to a hung parliament, a very rare 
occurrence in Greek politics of the post-1974 period. ND came first in that 
election. SYRIZA (ƶǑǌĮıȺǈıǋǗǐ ƵǈǅǎıȺĮıĲǈǉǀǐ ƧǏǈıĲİǏƾǐ ± Radical Left 
Coalition), the main anti-bailout party, emerged as the second most 
popular party, while PASOK finished third ± for the first time since the 
1970s. The repeat election of June 2012 led to another hung parliament, 
but also strengthened SYRIZA¶VSRVLWLRQDVVHFRQGSDUW\DQGDVOHDGLQJ
party of the opposition. A three-party coalition government was eventually 
formed after the June 2012 election with the support of ND, PASOK and 
DIMAR (ƩǆǋǎǉǏĮĲǈǉǀ ƧǏǈıĲİǏƾ - Democratic Left).  
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The June 2012 electoral contest was not conducted under the same 
rules as the other races examined here as it involved closed party lists. 
The previous elections had allowed voters to mark preferred candidates 
from a specific party. Inclusion and order of appearance of candidate 
names in the June 2012 lists was based on the results of the May 2012 
election. This led to minimal discrepancies between the results of the two 
races that were held in 2012. Although the results of the two elections 
mark two different parliamentary terms (14th and 15th respectively), we 
will treat the two elections of 2012 as a single observation. 
 
A Familiar Pattern of Decline? 
The dynastic phenomenon appears to be in secular decline in most liberal 
democracies for which there is systematic evidence. The few relevant 
studies of twentieth century Greece, although not directly comparable due 
to dissimilar or unclear definitions of the dynastic variable, also imply a 
similar trend (Legg 1969; Tziovaras & Chiotis 2004). There is reason to 
expect that this trend continues in twenty-first century Greece, especially 
due to the most recent developments in the country.  
In particular, the two elections of 2012 were conducted under record 
levels of voter dissatisfaction with the political establishment (see reports 
by Dinas & Rori 2013; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2013). The two races 
were fought along a novel fault line: pro-bailout/pro-austerity against 
anti-bailout/anti-austerity.4 The combined share of the vote for ND and 
PASOK fell to 32 per cent in May 2012, and to 42 per cent in June 2012 
(see Table 2). The post-2010 period is seen by commentators as marking 
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the end of the Metapolitefsi, the political arrangement that followed the 
transition to democracy in 1974 (Lyrintzis 2011; Mavris 2012; Pappas 
2013). The repeated inability of ND or PASOK to form a single-party 
majority government in the 2012 races, the rise of the left, and the entry 
of a larger than usual number of minor parties in parliament have been 
LQWHUSUHWHGDVDQHOHFWRUDOLQGLFWPHQWRIWKHµROGUHJLPH¶DQGLWVSUDFWLFHV. 
In this setting dynastic politicians might offer a clear target for 
electoral punishment. Previous research has noted the electoral 
implications of deteriorating economic conditions, especially their punitive 
consequences for the political actors seen as responsible. Economic 
shocks such as sovereign defaults, depressions and the fiscal responses to 
these conditions can undermine the stability of autocracies and 
democracies alike; within democratic polities, these shocks can increase 
electoral volatility aQGSROLWLFDOH[WUHPLVPVHHH[DPSOHVLQ2¶'RQQHOO
1973; Linz 1978; Lewis-Beck 1988; Jackman & Volpert 1996; Bosco and 
Verney 2012; Lewis-Beck, Costa Lobo & Bellucci 2012). Since the Greek 
political class is publicly seen as responsible for the crisis and its 
management, and dynastic politicians serve as archetypal representatives 
of that class, voters may be particularly reluctant to vote for those 
politicians. This applies especially to dynastic politicians that belong to 
extended political families due to their salient, decades-long presence in 
parliament and the well-known patronage networks that surround them.  
A note is in order. We cannot test the mediating, micro-level 
mechanism regarding the way in which voters attribute responsibility for 
the ongoing crisis and its management. We remain agnostic as to 
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individual motives: voters may blame the political establishment for 
PLVPDQDJLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRP\in past decades or, more cynically, 
they may blame it for its current inability to distribute rents under 
austerity. However, we are able to observe the hypothesised outcome of 
these mechanisms as a decline in the number of dynastic MPs in the two 
µDXVWHULW\¶HOHFWLRQVRI 2012 compared to the pre-crisis elections. The 
decline should take place despite the electoral advantages associated with 
belonging to a political family.  
 
Data 
The dataset documents the number of dynastic MPs at the beginning of 
six recent parliamentary terms. Since Greece lacks the equivalent to the 
British History of Parliament series or the Biographical Directory of the 
American Congress, we had to collect primary information on kinship ties 
for the universe of MPs elected in the six races.  
The six general elections marked the start of the respective 
parliamentary terms (terms 10 to 15). The maintaining election of 2000 
was closely won by the incumbent party (PASOK). The 2004 election 
produced an alternation in government between PASOK (outgoing) and 
ND (incoming). The maintaining election of 2007 was won by the 
incumbent party (ND). The 2009 election produced an alternation between 
ND (outgoing) and PASOK (incoming). These elections allowed us to 
compare any changes in the phenomenon of interest in typical races of 
the post-1974 period. To cover the crisis period we collected data for the 
May 2012 election and the June 2012 election (the current term at the 
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time of writing), the only ones conducted so far. Any conclusion we draw 
from this more recent period can only be tentative. 
The dataset contains information on whether each elected MP has a 
family connection with another MP of the current or a previous term. We 
collected kinship information from public sources such as personal 
websites and official biographies. When this failed to produce conclusive 
information, we contacted Library of Parliament staff and, when possible, 
the MPs themselves.  
7KHRSHUDWLRQDOGHILQLWLRQRIDµG\QDVWLFSROLWLFLDQ¶XVHGKHUHLV narrow 
enough to facilitate application across party systems and over time (cf. 
Kurtz 1989). According to this definition, a dynastic MP comes from a 
family with two or more members who hold or have held a seat in 
parliament. Kinship is defined on the basis of two criteria: one 
consanguineous, more specifically descent from a common grandparent 
through the male or female line; another affinal, that is relationship by 
marriage, including current or former spouse, brother/sister in law, 
father/mother in law, son/daughter in law. Applying these criteria, second 
cousins do not count as relatives as they do not come from a common 
grandparent. First cousins do. The definition was not applied 
retrospectively. For instance, consider two MPs, A and B, who are related. 
A was elected at time t, while B was elected at time t-1. Using the present 
definition, B does not count as a dynastic MP at time t-1. In short, B 
becomes a dynastic MP only once A also enters parliament. 
We also distinguish between a hard and a soft form of dynastic status. 
In particular, we record whether a dynastic MP is related to more than one 
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otheU03µPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLFRUQRWµVLQJOH¶G\QDVWLF7KLVDOORZVXVWR
FDSWXUHH[WHQGHGSROLWLFDOIDPLOLHVµPXOWLSOH¶ZKLFKXVXDOO\KDYHDORQJ-
standing presence in parliament, and to differentiate those families from 
one-off connections between two M3VµVLQJOH¶7KHIRUPHUFDQEH
considered as the core of the dynastic phenomenon. For an illustration of 
WKHIDPLO\QHWZRUNVDURXQGµPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF03VDQGWKHLUKHUHGLWDU\
and lasting nature, see the diagram in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Finally, we note the fact that the communist KKE (ƮǎǋǋǎǑǌǈıĲǈǉǗ 
ƮǗǋǋĮ ƪǊǊƾįĮǐ - Communist Party of Greece) was banned from 
participating in elections for the decades that followed WWII and the Civil 
War, and until the collapse of military rule in 1974. Therefore, MPs related 
to historically prominent but formally unelected KKE members cannot be 
FODVVLILHGDVµG\QDVWLF¶LQRXUGDWDVHW2QWKHZKROHWKHUHVWULFWLYH
definition of kinship applied in the present analysis (close family ties 
among elected MPs going back a maximum of two generations) possibly 
underestimates the extent of the dynastic phenomenon.  
 
Results 
This section begins with some general observations. By far the most 
common type of kinship ties among MPs is between parent and child, and 
predominantly between father and son. This applies to more than half of 
the dynastic politicians that we identified in each election. These vertical 
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ties fit with what the literature describes as hereditary (intergenerational) 
capital flows between MPs.  
There are three main ways in which family connections appear in 
parliament in the period covered. First, the junior dynastic MP enters the 
fray only once the senior MP has withdrawn from electoral competition 
altogether. For an example of this very common pattern of succession, 
see case F15 in the Appendix. This particular SYRIZA MP was elected for 
the first time in parliament in 2012, while her father was last elected in 
the same constituency in 2004. Second, the junior MP successfully 
FRQWHVWVWKHVDPHHOHFWLRQDVWKHVHQLRU03LQWKHVHQLRU03¶Vtraditional 
constituency, but the latter has now moved to a different constituency. 
For an example see case F28 in the Appendix. This ND MP was elected for 
the first time in parliament in 2000, in the same constituency that his 
father used to hold, but the latter had already moved successfully to a 
different constituency in that same year. In a third way, two MPs from the 
same family successfully compete in the same election and in the same 
multimember constituency. For example, cases F10 and F11, from ND and 
PASOK respectively, are first cousins.  
Table 4 contains a summary of results discussed in this section (see a 
separate Appendix for the full list of dynastic MPs). The percentages in the 
bottom row of Table 4 compare directly the six elections. The overall 
presence of dynastic MPs in parliament remained unchanged from 2000 to 
2009 (14% to 16% of all seats were dynastic, i.e. more than 40 seats in 
each term). This fell to nine and ten per cent in May 2012 and June 2012 
respectively. The modest decline in 2012, which could be either a one-off 
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result or the start of a trend, took place in a climate of economic recession 
and austerity, social unrest and the collapse of the two-party system, 
which was mostly driven by the collapse of the PASOK vote.5 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The partisan distribution of dynastic MPs is noteworthy. The major 
concentration of dynastic MPs in the pre-crisis elections of 2000 and 2009 
is found in the two major parties, ND and PASOK. Roughly one in five ND 
legislators and one in ten PASOK legislators are dynastic. These ratios 
remain similar in the two austerity elections of May and June 2012 despite 
the declining electoral share of both parties.6 Also worth noting is that 
three of the four parties that gained entry in parliament in 2004 were 
KHDGHGE\µPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF03VLHOHJLVODWRUVUHODWHGWRPRUHWKDQRQH
other MP (cases B1, B15 and B35 in the Appendix). In 2007 and 2009 
HDFKRIWKHWZRPDMRUSDUWLHVZDVDOVRKHDGHGE\DµPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF
member. 
Could the modest dynastic decline in 2012 mean that voters turned 
their backs on dynastic MPs ± the latter, in one interpretation, seen as the 
embodiment of a political system responsible for the economic crisis? 
Rather than only looking at levels across different elections, we also 
compared what happened to individual MPs over time. In detail, we 
examined directly whether dynastic MPs were affected differently by the 
crisis compared to non dynastic MPs. We compared the 2009 contest, the 
final election before the crisis, and the June 2012 contest, the most 
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bitterly fought election in the crisis period, which also did not return ND 
and PASOK as the two most popular parties. This comparison allowed us 
to determine whether dynastic MPs elected in 2009 were equally likely to 
survive in June 2012 as their non dynastic counterparts. The percentage 
splits in Table 5 suggest that a dynastic MP elected in 2009 (second row) 
was slightly more likely to achieve re-election in June 2012 compared to a 
non dynastic MP (first row).  
This is confirmed further if we adopt a more fine-tuned approach. The 
third and fourth rows in Table 5 split the dynastic 03VRILQWRµVLQJOH¶
UHODWHGWRRQO\RQHRWKHU03DQGµPXOWLSOH¶UHODWHGWRPRUHWKDQRQH
other MP) respectively. While eight in WHQµVLQJOH¶G\QDVWLF03VIDLOHGWR
get re-HOHFWHGµPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF03VVXUYLYHGWKHHOHFWLRQRI-XQH
with minimal losses ± only one failed to get re-elected.7  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIGLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQµVLQJOH¶DQGµPXOWLSOH¶WLHV
becomes clearer in Figure 2. The trend indicates that the percentage of 
µPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF03VGDVKHGOLQHUHmains stable across the six 
elections. This implies the existence of an advantage of extended political 
IDPLOLHVUHJDUGLQJWKHLUPHPEHUV¶success in parliament even in unstable 
WLPHVFRPSDUHGWRDOORWKHU03W\SHVµVLQJOH¶G\QDVWLFRUQRQG\QDVWLF
In total, if we exclude one-off family connections between two single MPs 
(solid thin line), the dynastic persistence becomes clearer especially 
during the collapse of the traditional two-party system.  
 21 
 
 
 [Figure 2 about here] 
 
We note here that the dynastic advantage is not simply about securing 
a seat in parliament. As the literature suggests, belonging to a political 
family can also determine promotion to ministerial office and other salient 
posts (Legg 1969; Sotiropoulos & Bourikos 2002). Focusing on the 
parliamentary class that came out of the most recent election, that of 
June 2012, ZHZLOOFRPSDUHWKHFDUHHUVRIµVLQJOH¶DQGµPXOWLSOH¶G\QDstic 
MPs. This exercise takes into account the Cabinet reshuffle that took place 
in June 2014. While six in 14 µVLQJOH¶G\QDVWLFPHPEHUVKDYHVHUYHGRU
are serving in junior or senior Cabinet postsWKHUDWLRDPRQJµPXOWLSOH¶
dynastic MPs is a striking 14 in 17. This implies a clear career advantage 
for the latter dynastic group+RZHYHUµPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF03VWHQGWR
come overwhelmingly from ND or PASOK, and would be more likely to 
have served in ministerial positions for that reason alone rather than for 
their dynastic status. To control for this, we limit our comparison only to 
dynastic MPs that come from PASOK and ND. This produces a similar 
pattern. While five in eight µVLQJOH¶G\QDVWLFPHPEHUVKDYHVHUYHGRUDUH
serving currently in Cabinet SRVLWLRQVWKHUDWLRDPRQJµPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF
MPs is 14 in 15. Belonging to the latter category seems to help promote 
RQH¶VSROLWLFDOFDUHHUDOWKRXJKWKHDGYDQWDJHLVQRWDs pronounced as in 
the case of simple re-election. 
All this leads to a cautious conclusion. It appears that a series of 
seismic changes ± the sharp decline of the electoral share of the former 
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parties of government, the rise of a radical left party as the main 
opposition party for the first time since 1958, and the entry of various 
protest parties in parliament ± have not challenged the substantial 
presence of dynastic members in the Greek parliament. µMultiple¶ dynastic 
MPs seem to be particularly resilient in this respect. Although we have not 
examined directly the relative validity of standard explanations of the 
dynastic electoral advantage (human or political capital flows), the 
electoral resilience of such MPs implies that this advantage remains potent 
in good times (2000 to 2009) and in bad ones; for instance, under record 
levels of voter dissatisfaction. In fact, the modest drop that was 
doFXPHQWHGLQVHHPVWREHDQDUWHIDFWRIVLPSOHµLQFXPEHQW
punishment¶ as expressed in the electoral collapse of PASOK - the 
governing party that negotiated and first signed the international bailout 
terms, and then applied the austerity programme - rather than an 
indictment of dynastic politicians or of the old regime per se. 
 
Discussion 
The study used biographical details of MPs elected in 2000, 2004, 2007, 
2009 and 2012 (May and June) to document the extent of the dynastic 
presence in the Greek parliament. We found that the phenomenon was 
not negligible, and that it was remarkably stable over time, and in 
comparison with previous research (Tziovaras & Chiotis 2004). The timing 
of the most recent elections also allowed us to ask whether the extent of 
the phenomenon had been affected by the economic downturn and the 
ongoing implementation of the austerity programme. Family ties among 
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parliamentarians became less common in the 2012 races compared to the 
elections that preceded the economic crisis, although this did not apply to 
µmultiple¶ ties, that is to say those referring to notable political families, 
which remained stable. In addition, the modest overall decline of dynastic 
MPs was not as sharp as the decline of the combined share of the vote for 
ND and PASOK, the latter party suffering more. We take this as an 
indication of the relative persistence of the phenomenon despite the 
predicted eroding effect of the economic shock. Future election results will 
allow more meaningful conclusions on this point.  
The analysis leaves some unexamined aspects. First, practical 
constraints led to the use of a narrow definition of µdynastic politician¶, 
which also ignored candidates. Second, six elections might not offer a long 
enough time-span in which to detect changes in the dynamics of the 
phenomenon. Also, using a single year (2012) to tap trends in the µcrisis¶ 
era neglects the finding of previous research that dynastic erosion is of a 
glacial nature. We might be able to observe a clear decline in the numbers 
of dynastic MPs as future data points come in. Inversely, we might 
observe an increase in their ranks if the country re-enters normal politics; 
for instance, once party formations become more stabilised. Finally, we 
are aware that part of our argument is based on inferences about what 
motivates political behaviour without having access to the relevant 
empirical information. To overcome this limitation, we would need to 
analyse survey responses on popular stereotypes of the Greek political 
class with special reference to political families and their patronage 
networks. To our knowledge, this information simply does not exist.  
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Limitations notwithstanding, the relative resilience of dynastic 
politicians permits some tentative conclusions. The findings suggest that 
an economic shock, which then turns into a political crisis, cannot mitigate 
the dynastic electoral advantage at least in the short term. This is rather 
impressive since the 2012 results registered some remarkable changes in 
the Greek political landscape and are commonly interpreted as a 
watershed moment. In the same context, it seems that stereotypes of 
dynastic politicians as key elements of an apparently dysfunctional 
political system do not matter negatively at the polls, even though that 
µsystem¶ is typically condemned in public discourse as the cause of the 
FRXQWU\¶VFXUUHQWSUHGLFDPHQW (cf. Konstantinidis & Xezonakis 2013). 
The absence of comparable systematic information from other 
European countries, along with the labour-intensive nature of collecting 
the required biographical details, hinders direct crossnational 
comparisons. However, case studies of the dynastic presence in similar 
contexts will be able to determine whether Greece is sui generis regarding 
dynastic resilience in twenty-first century Europe, especially under major 
economic and political system shifts.  
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Table 1 Greek Prime Ministers, 1974-2012 
Name (tenure as PM) Preceding generation in politics 
  
Konstantinos Karamanlis  
(1974-1980)  
 
[None preceding] a 
Georgios Rallis  
(1980-81) 
 
Father (MP); uncle (premier); grandfathers 
(premiers) 
 
Andreas Papandreou  
(1981-89; 1993-96) 
 
Father (premier) 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis  
(1990-93) 
Father (MP); uncle (MP); grandfathers (MPs) 
 
Kostas Simitis  
(1996-2004) 
 
[None preceding] b  
Kostas Karamanlis  
(2004-09) 
 
Uncle (premier); uncle (MP) 
George Papandreou  
(2009-11) 
 
Father (premier); grandfather (premier) 
Antonis Samaras  
(2012-present) 
Uncle (MP); grandfather (MP)  
Note: The table excludes unelected heads of collaborationist (WWII), caretaker, 
transitional and national unity governments.  
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a: Karamanlis also served as Prime Minister in the pre-dictatorship era. He was 
related by marriage (1951) to the Kanellopoulos and Gounaris political families. This 
however happened decades after he was first elected in parliament (1935). Clogg 
(1987: 47) still considers this as another example of the dynastic nature of modern 
Greek politics. 
b: This is a debatable point. Georgios Simitis, father of Kostas Simitis, was a member 
of the (unofficial) Communist-influenced government that, following elections, ruled 
large parts of Greece in the end of World War II. 
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Table 2 Recent Election Results 
 General election 
Parties in parliament 2000 2004 2007 2009 2012a 2012b 
       
PASOK (centre left) 
 
43.8% 
(158)# 
40.5% 
(117) 
 
38.1% 
(102) 
43.9%  
(160)# 
13.2% 
(41) 
12.3%  
(33)# 
ND (centre right) 
 
42.7% 
(125) 
45.4%  
(165)# 
 
41.8% 
(152)# 
33.5% 
(91) 
18.8% 
(108) 
29.7%  
(129)# 
KKE (communist) 
 
5.5% 
(11) 
5.9% 
(12) 
 
8.1% 
(22) 
7.5% 
(21) 
8.5% 
(26) 
4.5% 
(12) 
SYN/SYRIZA (radical left) 
 
3.2% 
(6) 
3.3% 
(6) 
 
5.0% 
(14) 
4.6% 
(13) 
16.8% 
(52) 
26.9% 
(71) 
LAOS (radical right) 
 - 
 
- 
3.8% 
(10) 
5.6% 
(15) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
Independent Greeks (nationalist 
right) 
 
- 
 
- - 
 
- 
10.6% 
(33) 
7.5% 
(20) 
 
Golden Dawn (far right) 
 - - - - 
7.0% 
(21) 
6.9% 
(18) 
 
DIMAR (left) 
 
- - - - 
6.1% 
(19) 
6.3%  
(17)# 
 33 
 
 
Note: Cell entries show vote shares, with seats in parentheses. The first party receives a 
bonus in seats. A majority government needs 151 of a total of 300 seats. 
#: In government 
Source: Official results 
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Table 3 Declining Trust in the Political System 
 
Year 
Institutional trust (%) 
Parties Parliament Government 
2003 20 54 47 
2004 17 61 50 
2005 23 52 42 
2006 24 55 43 
2007 21 53 44 
2008 16 41 29 
2009 17 40 35 
2010 9 23 25 
2011 5 15 12 
2012 6 11 7 
2013 4 10 9 
Note: Cell entries show the percentage of those who 
tend to trust the institution. Other responses are 
excluded (tend not to WUXVWGRQ¶WNQRZ 
Source: Eurobarometer, annual averages. Question: 
µ)RUHDFKRIWKHIROORZLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVSOHDVHWHOOPHLI
\RXWHQGWRWUXVWLWRUWHQGQRWWRWUXVWLW"¶ 
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Table 4 Dynastic MPs, 2000-12 
 General election 
Parties in parliament 2000 2004 2007 2009 2012a 2012b 
       
PASOK (centre left) 
 
17/158 13/117 12/102 20/160 5/41 3/33 
ND (centre right) 
 
29/125 29/165 33/152 18/91 17/108 20/129 
KKE (communist) 
 
1/11 1/12 0/22 2/21 1/26 1/12 
SYN/SYRIZA (radical left) 
 
0/6 1/6 1/14 0/13 2/52 5/71 
LAOS (radical right) 
 
- - 
0/10 1/15 
- - 
Independent Greeks (nationalist 
right) 
 
- - - - 
1/33 0/20 
Golden Dawn (far right) 
 
- - - - 
2/21 2/18 
DIMAR (left) 
 
- - - - 
0/19 0/17 
 
TOTAL 
(% dynastic MPs) 
 
47/300 
(16%) 
 
44/300 
(15%) 
 
46/300 
(15%) 
 
41/300 
(14%) 
 
28/300 
(9%) 
 
31/300 
(10%) 
Note: Cell entries show the ratio of dynastic MPs to the total number of MPs for each party 
Source: Online Appendix 
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Table 5 Dynastic MPs More Likely to Survive 
  Re-elected in 2012b? 
MP type (2009)  No Yes 
    
Non dynastic 
[Base=259] 
 60% 
 
40% 
 
Dynastic 
[Base=41] 
 56% 
 
44% 
 
 Single dynastic  
[Base=26] 
81% 19% 
 Multiple dynastic 
[Base=15] 
7% 93% 
TOTAL 
[N=300] 
 60% 
 
40% 
 
Note: A µmultiple¶ dynastic MP is related to more than one other MP.  
Source: Online Appendix 
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Figure 1 An example of multiple kinship ties among MPs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The kinship network in the above example extends to local 
government (excluded from the diagram). 
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Figure 2 Kinship ties and electoral survival 
Note$µPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF03LVUHODWHGWRPRUHWKDQRQHRWKHU03 
Source: Online Appendix 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 These included, among others, the Avgerinos, Zaimis, Deligiannis, 
Mavrokordatos, Mavromichalis, Koumoundouros, Stefanopoulos, 
Theotokis, Trikoupis, and Tsatsos families. 
2 The following observation comes from ethnographic fieldwork in central 
Greece during local mayoral elections in the 1980s (Nitsiakos 1993, pp. 
66-67). Due to the small scale of the electorate taking part in local 
contests, it was sometimes easy to predict the final distribution of votes 
purely on the basis of kinship networks. The alignment between kinship 
and political support was so close that on those rare occasions when 
members of one network broke ranks and voted for the candidate of 
another network, trouble ensued.  
3 For an illustration of the rather unpopular transformations that have 
been taking place since 2010 with the aim of fiscal consolidation, the 
government suspended all new appointments for 2010 in the public sector 
(central government, municipalities, public companies, local governments, 
state agencies and other public institutions). To reduce further the public 
VHFWRU¶VZRUNIRUFHWKHJRYHUQPHQWDGRSWHGDJHQHUDOUXOHIRUWKHSHULRG
2011-2013: a ratio of one hire to five departures (Law 3833/2010: 
articles 10 & 11, with exceptions), which later become one to ten. This 
provision was also included in the bailout agreement known as the 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies that the Greek 
government signed with its international creditors (Law 3845/2010).  
4 Polarisation on the new fault line was less intense in the May campaign. 
Up to that point the two traditional contenders for power were still PASOK 
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and ND, both on the pro-austerity side. This changed after the May 
election, when ND and the anti-austerity SYRIZA became the two main 
contenders.  
5 We cannot discount empirically the possibility that the number of 
dynastic MPs remained approximately stable in parliament, but the 
number of dynastic candidates increased dramatically in the 2012 
elections. This case of electoral punishment of dynastic politicians would 
remain undetected in the present analysis, which does not have access to 
data on losing candidates. However, we do not consider this increase in 
dynastic candidates very plausible, especially in the context of 
unprecedented public disaffection with the Greek political class.  
6 OQHRIWKHG\QDVWLF03VHOHFWHGZLWKWKHQHZSDUW\µ,QGHSHQGHQW
*UHHNV¶LQ0D\ZDVDIRUPHU1'03FDVHE23 in the Appendix). One 
of the dynastic MPs elected with SYRIZA in June 2012 was a former 
PASOK and KKE MP (case F22 in the Appendix). 
7 The one µPXOWLSOH¶G\QDVWLF03WKDWZDVQRWUH-elected in 2012 (case D15 
in the Appendix) defected from her party and participated as leader of a 
new party, which then failed to enter parliament. 
